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Abstract 
Toleration and civility are commonly treated as synonyms. This paper elaborates a novel 
distinction between the concepts and suggests that the relatively neglected idea of civility may 
provide a more promising basis for the accommodation of normative diversity in a liberal polity. 
It argues that liberal regimes of toleration depend for their success on a form of fraternal 
solidarity among citizens that is unlikely to flourish in conditions of liberal freedom. Regimes of 
civility, by contrast, depend on a form of liberal friendship that is more congruent with the wider 
tendencies of a liberal culture. 
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There is often said to be something cowardly about self-censorship. Those newspaper editors 
who chose not to republish the Charlie Hebdo Muhammad cartoons that provoked the January 
2015 shootings in France were widely criticized for their failure to stand up for free speech. 
Their self-censorship was deemed a spineless surrender to what Timothy Garton Ash termed the 
³assassin¶s veto´: ³:KHUHWKHKHFNOHU¶VYHWRVD\VPHUHO\µI will shout you down,¶ WKHDVVDVVLQ¶V
version is µdare to express that and we will kill you.¶´1 
But not everyone saw it this way. The Guardian newspaper insisted that its decision not 
to republish the cartoons ± both in the Charlie Hebdo case and in the earlier Danish Muhammad 
cartoons controversy ± was not a product of the fear of reprisals, but rather of the principled 
conviction that ³intolerance is best fought by tolerance´2 and a sense of the importance of 
crafting a ³more inclusive public culture´3 The argument here is that self-censorship is to be 
seen as part and parcel of a practice of toleration. And the practice of toleration is valuable not 
just instrumentally, as a way of preventing violence and disorder, but also intrinsically. It is good 
to tolerate, because the practice of toleration makes possible a rewarding way of living with other 
people. 
How persuasive is this argument? In this paper, I shall suggest that it is surprisingly hard 
to see the good of toleration in a liberal democratic society. But my aim in so doing is not to 
endorse the association of self-censorship and cowardice. I think it is possible to make sense of 
the conviction that it can be good to self-censor, but that to do so we may need to see it not as an 
expression of toleration, but rather as an expression of civility. 
This might seem a curious suggestion. The idea of civility has not attracted as much 
attention in the scholarly literature as the idea of toleration, and, when it is discussed, civility is 
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often treated as being more or less synonymous with toleration (in the piece I referred to above, 
for example, Garton Ash appears to use the two terms interchangeably). But this could be a 
mistake. My larger aim here is to suggest that it is possible to draw a deep and potentially fertile 
distinction between toleration and civility. I shall argue that the concept of civility has been 
unduly neglected in the literature, and that it provides a distinctively promising way of thinking 
about the accommodation of diversity in a liberal polity. 
,WDNHDVP\VWDUWLQJSRLQW6DPXHO6FKHIIOHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHJRRGRIWROHUDWLRQ4 
6FKHIIOHU¶VFHQWUDOFRQWHQWLRQ, which I outline in the first section, is that the practice of toleration 
is a good because it makes possible a rewarding form of fraternal solidarity among citizens. But, 
in the second section, I shall argue that the form of fraternal solidarity that Scheffler identifies is 
not one that is likely to flourish or even to be found especially attractive in conditions of liberal 
freedom. On the contrary, the practice of toleration seems likely to undermine the forms of 
solidarity we would expect to flourish in such conditions. For this reason, I contend that 
toleration-based accounts of the good of self-censorship fail adequately to answer the critics. I 
IRFXVRQ6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWIRUthree reasons. First, his is one of the more developed and 
interesting accounts of the good of toleration, as opposed to its moral justification or conceptual 
structure. 6HFRQGO\ZKLOH,XOWLPDWHO\UHMHFW6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWDVDQDSSURSULDWHPRGHOIRU
thinking about the accommodation of diversity in liberal societies, I nevertheless endorse his 
strategy for demonstrating the good of accommodation. As I have indicated, Scheffler articulates 
the good of toleration by linking its practice with the emergence of a particular form of 
solidarity. In the latter parts of the article, I build on that strategy in order to articulate the good 
of civility by linking it with the emergence of a particular form of friendship.  Finally, I regard 
6FKHIIOHU¶V account as presenting a hard case for the thesis ,PHDQWRGHYHORS6FKHIIOHU¶V
 5 
account of toleration is a liberalized account ± he departs from the standard understanding of 
toleration in order to render it more consistent with liberal commitments. Thus, if even 
6FKHIIOHU¶VOLEHUDOWROHUDWLRQLVDWRGGV with the conditions of a liberal culture, then it seems 
unlikely that non-liberal variants (be they more traditional or more deeply democratic) will fare 
any better. 
However, the distinction I intend to draw between toleration and civility cuts more 
deeply, and so, in the third section, I broaden the focus to consider the discourse of toleration 
more generally. I suggest that the diverging discourses of toleration and civility can help to 
illuminate a deeper distinction between two quite different modes of accommodation of 
diversity. Finally, and on that basis, I suggest a distinctive civility-based account of the good of 
self-censorship that is more congruent with the wider tendencies of a liberal culture. 
Before proceeding, it is worth making two clarificatory remarks. First, it is important to 
emphasize that the enterprise here is not one of justifying the accommodation of diversity by 
associating it with a form of solidarity that (I claim) persons have reason to value. My argument 
does not suppose that solidarity is a universal good, and I do not claim that people who do not 
find solidarity (of whatever kind) valuable are guilty of any kind of error. In seeking to articulate 
the good of practices of accommodation, the aim is to explain why it is that many people do 
indeed find such practices to be valuable. As Scheffler notes, this is a question that has often 
been neglected in the literature (GT, 313). I shall FDVWGRXEWRQ6FKHIIOHU¶VH[SODQDWLRQRIthe 
good of accommodation, which makes the ideas of toleration and fraternity central, and propose 
an alternative explanation, which I argue is more congruent with the conditions of a liberal 
society, and which makes the ideas of civility and friendship central. 
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Secondly, in what follows I make various claims about the character of liberal cultures. It 
is important to be clear that, in making these claims, I refer to the sorts of cultural conditions that 
certain theories of liberal political order should lead us to anticipate. I am not making claims 
about the cultural conditions of actually existing liberal societies. Thus, while the claims I will 
make are in principle empirically testable ± we can ask whether liberal political orders so 
conceived really would bring about the sorts of cultural conditions I describe ± they are not 
directly empirical claims about the societies we inhabit. 
 
Toleration and Fraternity 
Scheffler seeks to explain how a liberal regime of toleration is able to attract the enthusiastic 
allegiance of its supporters. In this way, his account ³straddles´ the familiar distinction between 
toleration as a political practice and as an individual attitude or virtue - his interest is in what 
makes the practice appealing to individuals (GT, 321).5 
Scheffler interprets toleration in an unconventional way. According to John Horton the 
³WUDGLWLRQDO´VHQVHRIWROHUDWLRQLQYROYHV³WKHZLOOLQJSXWWLQJXSZLWKWKHEHOLHIVactions or 
practices of others by a person or group that disapproves of them, and who would otherwise be 
LQFOLQHGWRSURKLELWRUVXSSUHVVWKHPLIWKH\KDGWKHSRZHUWRGRVR´ 6  In this sense, toleration 
(paradoxically) combines disapproval of p with acceptance of p and possesses a hierarchical 
structure: my toleration of p implies that I have the power to prohibit or suppress p. Scheffler 
suggests that he conforms to the traditional account in understanding toleration as a mode of 
responding to, and of accommodating, normative diversity (as opposed to non-normative 
diversity - of age, physical characteristics or geographical location for instance).7 However, he 
departs from the traditional interpretation by characterizing the ideal of toleration informing 
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liberal regimes as a symmetrical ideal rather than as a hierarchical one that holds that only the 
SRZHUIXODUHLQDSRVLWLRQWRWROHUDWH2Q6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWWROHUDWLRQDSSOLHVWRLQGLYLGXDOV
and groups of differing size, strength and power: ³each of us is called upon to tolerate everyone 
HOVH´ (GT, 315). Furthermore, on his account, toleration need not imply disapproval (GT, 321). 
While some of the beliefs and forms of conduct that the regime of toleration protects will attract 
disapproval, this is not a necessary condition of their protection under that regime. Nor is it a 
necessary condition of my being individually tolerant that I disapprove of the objects of my 
tolerance (though this will often be the case). 
Scheffler suggests that toleration is regarded as a problematic value because it can often 
involve conceding a kind of authority to values and principles that one rejects. By 
accommodating your wishes, I allow my conduct to be guided by what you perceive to be 
valuable, and in that sense I defer to your values: 
 
,IIRUH[DPSOHDQHPSOR\HH¶VUHOLJLRQGHFODUHVWKDWDFHUWDLQGD\LVDKROLGD\ZKLFKLVWR
be devoted to prayer and reflection, and if the employee asks the employer for the day off 
so that she can observe the holiday, then the employer is being asked to guide his conduct 
LQOLJKWRIUHDVRQVGHULYLQJIURPWKHSURQRXQFHPHQWVRIWKHHPSOR\HH¶VUHOLJLRQ (GT, 
329) 
 
Given the importance people place upon shaping their lives around the values and principles they 
endorse, this sort of concession of authority may strike those who would tolerate as ³tantamount 
to the abandonment of their own values and principles rendering them complicit in practices and 
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ways of life that they do not accept and may well detest´ (GT, 328). At the limit, this may be 
H[SHULHQFHGDVDEHWUD\DORIRQH¶VYDOXHVDQGHYHQDVDQDVVDXOWRQRQH¶VLQWHJULW\ 
This feature of toleration tends to provoke skepticism about its sustainability, and indeed 
about its value.8 The tolerant systematically (and quite deliberately) fail to stand up for what they 
believe to be right, and they potentially allow themselves by their passivity to be implicated in 
the perpetration of wrongs. As such, they betray their values, and they betray themselves. It is 
something like this concern that animates the popular uneasiness I have noted about self-
censorship - by choosing to censor myself, I culpably fail to speak up on behalf of my values.9  
But Scheffler suggests WKDWWKHDVVDXOWRQRQH¶VLQWHJULW\WKDWWROHUDWLRQLVWKRXJKWWR
provoke ³does not always materialize´ (GT, 330), and this is because the practice of toleration is 
sometimes experienced as a good. +HUH6FKHIIOHUWDNHVDFXHIURP706FDQORQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRI
tolerance. Scanlon argues that our reasons to value tolerance reside ³LQWKHUHODWLRQZLWKRQH¶V
fellow citizens that tolerance makes possible´10 5HJLPHVRIWROHUDWLRQRQ6FDQORQ¶VYLHZ
facilitate a ³more attractive and appealing´ way of living with other people, whilst intolerance 
involves ³a form of alienation from RQH¶VIHOORZFLWL]HQV´11 Likewise, Scheffler seeks to 
demonstrate that regimes of liberal toleration foster an attractive and rewarding form of fraternal 
solidarity among citizens. 
Whilst conceding authority to the values of others can sometimes be experienced as an 
DVVDXOWRQRQH¶VLQWHJULW\LWLVDOVRScheffler notes, a characteristic feature of certain forms of 
community life that are typically experienced as rewarding: 
 
many people experience the fact that they are implicated in the values of the other 
members of their society - that they are participants in a social practice through which 
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each is implicated in the values of the others - not as undermining their own integrity but 
rather as establishing a bond with their fellow citizens (GT, 331). 
 
The form of fraternity Scheffler has in mind here is modelled in the first place on actual fraternal 
relations among siblings, which are sustained by the ³unifying experience of mutual subjection 
to the authority of their parents´ (GT, 331). He suggests that an analogous form of solidarity is 
evident in various kinds of association, such as students in a classroom, soldiers in a military 
unity, or workers in a manufacturing plant. In each of these cases, and despite any internal 
differences and rivalries, there is ³a tendency to solidarity deriving from the shared experience of 
living together under a common authority´ (GT, 331). 
1RZLQ6FKHIIOHU¶VYLHZWKHUHLVQRHTXLYDOHQWIRUPRIFRPPRQDXWKRULW\WRZKLFKWKH
citizens of a liberal society are all subject.12 But, he contends that we are all nevertheless subject 
to the idea of authority: 
 
we must all confront the normative dimension of human experience. We all live in the 
shadow of norms, principles, reasons, and ideals that, rightly or wrongly, we regard as 
authoritative. And although our values vary, the experience of responding to normative 
authority - of trying to be guided by values and norms that we accept - is part of our 
common experience. And this too makes possible a form of solidarity - a form of 
solidarity that derives from the shared experience of subjection, not to a common 
authority figure, but to normativity or authority itself. (GT, 332) 
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Scheffler means to emphasize an important and neglected corollary of the fact of pluralism: that 
we all acknowledge values (of some kind), values that exert authority in our lives. In that sense, 
we all know what it is to be subject to authoritative moral demands, to be subject to normativity. 
And so that experience, of subjection to the authority of morality, is a shared experience, and 
one that Scheffler thinks may be able to ground a form of fraternal solidarity just as the shared 
experience of subjection to actual authority grounds attachments of fraternal solidarity. 
As an example of this, Scheffler observes the way in which ³the adherents of different 
religions sometimes feel a sense of solidarity with one another as participants in the common 
enterprise of responding to ideas of the sacred or the divine´ (GT, 332). Even though their 
respective moralities derive from distinct religious doctrines, the Christian and the Sikh both 
uphold religious doctrines that exert authority in their lives ± they both know what it is to be 
subject to authoritative moral claims. Their subjection to the authority of morality is an 
experience they hold in common, and hence a potential source of solidarity in the same way that 
the common experience of subjection to parental authority constitutes a potential source of 
solidarity among siblings.  
6R6FKHIIOHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHRIOLEHUDOWROHUDWLRQPD\EHVHHQDVDJRRGLQ
so far as participants in the practice see themselves as bound together in relations of fraternal 
solidarity grounded in their shared experience of subjection to normativity. And it is important 
that the regime of liberal toleration itself fosters those kinds of relations by encouraging citizens 
to recognize their shared predicament - by deferring to your values, I come to appreciate your 
sense (which I share) of subjection to normativity, and vice versa. Notice that, in making this 
claim, Scheffler acknowledges an idea that is common among those who favor more 
³FRPSUHKHQVLYH´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIOLEHUDOLVPWKDWOLEHUDOSROLWLFDORUGHUVH[HUWSHUYDVLYH
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cultural influence capable of shaping the way in which citizens see themselves and their 
relationships with others.13 
And Scheffler suggests that, in this way, we can see how a regime of liberal toleration 
that is initially supported for purely instrumental reasons may come to be seen as ³intrinsically 
worthy´ and as providing the structure for a valued and rewarding way of life (GT, 333): 
 
For some people, the most important of these rewards lies in the sense of enrichment that 
comes from developing an appreciation for forms of value that are realized in practices 
RWKHUWKDQRQH¶VRZQ2WKHUSHRSOHVLPSO\ILQGLWH[KLODUDWLQJWROLYHFRQILGHQWO\DPLGVW
the whirl of human diversity. For still other people, there are subversive and transgressive 
pleasures afforded by engagement with unfamiliar customs and practices. (GT, 333) 
 
,QWKLVZD\6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWSURYLGHVDSRVVLEOHDQVZHUWRWKRVHZKRDUHFULWLFDO of self-
censorship. He shows that it would be a mistake to think that the deference exhibited by the 
tolerant must necessarily be an expression of the fearful, prudential concern to avoid conflict. 
Nor need it be merely the expression of austere moral conviction. Rather, the practice of 
toleration (and the self-censorship it enjoins) may come to be seen on this view as an aspect of a 
particular way of living in solidarity with others that is valuable and rewarding in itself.  
I agree with Scheffler that the practice of toleration may serve to foster solidarity of the 
kind he describes. However, I am less convinced that the kind of solidarity he describes is a kind 
that will be found valuable and rewarding in conditions of liberal freedom. I will now explain 
why that is. 
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Fraternity and Freedom 
Judith Shklar once observed that ³the kinds of friendships people have may depend on the 
governments they live under.´14 In particular, she noted the ways in which friendships in liberal 
democracies may differ from those in authoritarian regimes. I will argue that the relations of 
fraternal comradeship that Scheffler invokes as support for the regime of liberal toleration are not 
relationships that are likely to flourish, or even to be found especially attractive, in conditions of 
liberal freedom. If that is so, then his account of the good of toleration will seem inadequate to 
the political and cultural circumstances in which inhabitants of liberal political orders find 
themselves. 
1RWLFHWKDW6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWWLHVWKHIRUPDWLRQRIVROLGDULW\WRWKHVKDUHGH[SHULHQFHRI
a kind of hierarchical authority (the subjection of children to parents, of soldiers to commanders, 
of workers to bosses). Where there is no shared experience of authority of this kind, there will be 
no grounds for fraternity, not at least of the kind that Scheffler describes. Moreover, it seems 
intuitive to suppose that the more strongly the sense of subjection to authority is felt, the stronger 
the basis for fraternity of the relevant kind becomes. Thus, evidence suggests that siblings with 
especially overbearing and authoritarian parents are likely to experience a stronger sense of 
fraternity in their shared subjection than siblings whose parents are more relaxed and laissez-
faire. The sense of having been ³through the wringer´ together, of sharing a common 
predicament, is likely to be all the greater in such cases.15 And similarly, citizens with a 
particularly strong sense of subjection to the ultimate and over-arching authority of moral values, 
principles and ideals seem likely to experience a stronger sense of fraternity (analogous to the 
fraternity of siblings) than citizens whose sense of subjection to normativity is less hierarchical.16 
It is no accident, I would suggest, that the example Scheffler chooses to illustrate his point is that 
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of fraternity between the adherents of different religions whose sense of subjection to the 
authority of morality is likely to be relatively strong and possesses a distinctly hierarchical form. 
It is harder to imagine how the same sort of fraternity might arise among those whose sense of 
subjection was weaker or of a different quality (though this is not to deny that other sorts of 
solidarity might arise in those cases). In other words, the more devout, god-fearing and zealous I 
am, the more likely it seems that I will recognize the relevant kind of (toleration-supporting) 
fraternity with my fellow citizens. 
We might think this an appealing implication of 6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWLWVXJJHVWVWKDW
relations of solidarity will be felt most keenly precisely where they are most needed - that is, 
among those most given to intolerance. But there is also something troubling in it, for it is a 
widely recognized (and advertised) feature of life in liberal society that it has the effect of 
weakening the sense of subjection to hierarchical authority of this kind. 
Several authors have observed the manner in which the pluralistic liberal public culture 
permeates the lives of those who inhabit it.17 It shapes them, as Stephen Macedo writes, ³broadly 
and deeply and relentlessly´18 And if the essence of a liberal morality is, as one author puts it, 
³the rejection of any final and exclusive authority, natural or supernatural, and of the 
accompanying compulsion and censorship´19 then a culture of liberalism is likely to be one in 
which the sense of subjection to authority is transformed. This is so not only in the sense that 
liberal states tend by their nature to be less authoritarian than non-liberal states, but also in the 
larger (though related) sense that liberal pluralism encourages us to see our individual projects 
and commitments as more conditional, more ³open to criticism, choice, and change´20 Macedo 
offers a particularly vivid illustration of this idea:  
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[Liberalism] holds out the promise, or the threat, of making all the world like California. 
By encouraging tolerance or even sympathy for a wide array of lifestyles and 
eccentricities, liberalism creates a community in which it is possible to decide that next 
week I might quit my career in banking, leave my wife and children, and join a buddhist 
cult.21 
 
2QWKHIDFHRILWWKLVYLVLRQRIOLIHLQDOLEHUDOVRFLHW\PLJKWEHWDNHQIRUHYLGHQFHRI6FKHIIOHU¶V
claim: surely only those who experience a very strong sense of subjection to the authority of 
morality would be disposed to make such a radical and costly break with the life they had 
previously lived. But I think that that would be a mischaracterization.  
To be very clear about this, I do not mean to suggest that normative considerations exert 
less authority in liberal cultures than in non-liberal cultures. I am not claiming that acculturated 
liberals are careless of morality, or that moral considerations necessarily play a less prominent 
role in their lives. My suggestion is rather that they do not experience their relationship to the 
normative dimension of human life in the same way as the devout - not just in terms of its 
content, but also in terms of its form and structure. Crucially, they do not experience that 
relationship as a form of subjection to authority analogous to the subjection to parental authority 
experienced by children. Instead, the sense of subjection to the authority of moral claims has a 
less hierarchical quality, and is taken to be more conditional, less final and exclusive, and more 
open to criticism and change.22 
We may think of Macedo's banker-cum-Buddhist as, in Charles Taylor's expression, a 
³seeker´ after meaning (one whose search may fail), and as Taylor points out: 
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those whose spiritual agenda is mainly defined in this way are in a fundamentally 
different predicament from that which dominated most previous cultures and still defines 
the lives of other people today. That alternative is a predicament in which an 
unchallengeable framework makes imperious demands which we fear being unable to 
meet. We face the prospect of irretrievable condemnation or exile, of being marked down 
in obloquy forever, or being sent to damnation irrevocably, or being relegated to a lower 
order through countless future lives. The pressure is potentially immense and 
inescapable, and we may crack under it. The form of the danger here is utterly different 
from that which threatens the modern seeker, which is something close to the opposite: 
the world altogether loses its spiritual contour, nothing is worth doing, the fear is of a 
terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo, or even a fracturing of our world and body-space23  
 
6RWKHFODLPKHUHLVQRWWKDW³VHHNHUV´DUHQRWVXEMHFWWRDXWKRULWDWLYHPRUDOFODLPVEXWUDWKHU
that the nature of their subjection to those claims is distinctive. In so far as the liberal culture 
fosters ³seekers´ rather than, as we might say, ³finders´, there is going to be trouble for 
Scheffler, for it is precisely the shared sense of subjection to hierarchical authority (not just the 
shared sense of there being an important normative dimension to life) that is meant to ground 
toleration-supporting solidarity on his account. 
,QRWKHUZRUGVLWLVDQLURQ\RI6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWWKDWWKHUHJLPHRIWROHUDWLRQDVKH
characterizes it encourages the development of, and is supported by, solidaristic relationships 
that are non-liberal in character, relationships to the development of which liberal cultures can be 
inhospitable. A regime of toleration that foregrounds a vision of life as centrally involving 
subjection to the hierarchical authority of morality, and that encourages people to understand 
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their own lives in that way, is likely to be experienced as alienating, and is likely to meet with 
resistance from the wider liberal culture. 
In fact, liberal cultures tend to foster a rather different kind of solidarity from the fraternal 
comradeship envisaged by Scheffler. Shklar writes that when ³one is used to personal freedom 
and really cherishes it, unity and oneness do not seem inherently quite so valuable. It is the 
ability to love without demanding likeness or agreement, especially on political matters, that 
marks the friendship of free men and women.´24 Cultures of liberal freedom are more conducive 
to forms of solidarity in which moral agreement or the shared experience of subjection to moral 
authority are less fundamental. 
We see this clearly enough in the case of modern personal friendship. The fuel that 
ignites and sustains such friendships is only seldom the fuel of moral consensus or a sense of a 
shared predicament provoked by subjection to normativity (or some other kind of authority). It is 
much more often a host of quotidian shared interests and shared pursuits: college attendance, dog 
ownership, tennis, TV shows, baking. Of course, such shared interests and pursuits might reflect 
deeper, underlying shared values, but equally they might not, and they are usually sufficient on 
their own to ground and sustain bonds of basic concern irrespective of moral differences.25 Moral 
differences and disagreements might sometimes intrude on such relationships, but it is often seen 
as just that: an intrusion of moral beliefs into a domain in which they are out of place. In his 
HPSLULFDOVWXG\*UDKDP/LWWOHFDOOVWKLV³VRFLDOIULHQGVKLS´26 Social friendship arises among 
WKRVHVLPLODUO\VLWXDWHG³WKRVHRIWKHVDPHW\SHFODVVQDWLRQJHQGHU´27 But it is sustained by a 
EDVLFGHVLUHIRUFRPSDQLRQVKLSWKDWJURZVDURXQGHYHU\GD\LQWHUHVWVDQGDFWLYLWLHV³VRPHRQHWR
go to the pictures with or FKDWZLWKDWWKHFOXERURYHUDFDSSXFFLQR´28 Little is rather dismissive 
of this sort of ³HDV\JRLQJIULHQGOLQHVV,´ precisely for its superficiality in setting aside deeper 
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commonalities and differences of moral conviction.29 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that it may 
ZHOOEH³WKHPRVWFRPPRQW\SHRIIULHQGVKLSWKHUHLV´LQPRGHUQ society.30  
In friendships of this kind, divergent values and moral particularities are de-emphasized. 
They are not suppressed or ignored; they are just taken to be (largely) beside the point. I do not 
care about Alex because we share moral convictions or the same experience of having moral 
convictions; I just care about her, and the origins and persistence of that care are probably 
explicable by reference to the sorts of everyday commonalities I have mentioned: our shared 
fondness for zombie movies, the paintings of Goya, hip hop.31 And perhaps the expressions of 
mutual concern and solidarity that we sometimes witness more generally among the members of 
a liberal society may have this kind of quality as well ± founded on shared circumstance and 
sustained by a myriad of assorted, transient everyday commonalities, both real and imagined. It 
could be a mistake, one that distorts the underlying ties of friendship, to suppose that there must 
be somewhere some shared sense of subjection to hierarchical authority that comprehensively 
explains those expressions of solidarity and concern. 
Solidarity of this kind seems more appropriate to a culture of modern liberal seekers who 
do not think of their lives as dictated by overarching and ultimately authoritative final values. In 
contrast to the bonds of those who share a strong sense of living under the dominion of particular 
values, we may think instead of the bonds of those who (happen to) share a more or less earnest 
quest for meaning. Bound neither by a sense of the common good, nor by a common experience 
of subjection, such friends might possibly be bound by a common fear of meaninglessness. But 
moral commonality, I have argued, is not critical here. The different and conflicting moral 
values, ends and purposes upheld by such friends are likely to seem less important to the 
relationship than the everyday commonalities that sustain it, for those values, ends and purposes 
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are less stable, less final, less fixed, less authoritative. This is the friendship of those disposed, in 
Michael Oakeshott's formulation, ³to prefer the road to the inn, ambulatory conversation to 
deliberation about means for achieving ends´32 
In this section, I have argued that it is the tendency of liberal cultures to encourage the 
DWWHQXDWLRQRIDSHUVRQ¶VVHQVHRIVXEMHFWLRQWR hierarchical authority and that, where this 
happens, a distinctive kind of liberal friendship can flourish. This kind of friendship is one in 
which the moral values and principles of the friends are de-emphasized - they are not considered 
to be essential to the relationship. I have suggested that in these circumstances the kind of 
fraternal comradeship described by Scheffler, for which moral values and principles are 
HVVHQWLDOLVXQOLNHO\WRIORXULVK$QGVLQFHWKHJRRGRIWROHUDWLRQRQ6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWGHSHQGV
on the proliferation of this kind of fraternity, and the recognition of it as a rewarding way of 
living with other people, the practice of toleration is unlikely to be seen as a good in a liberal 
culture. On the contrary, it is the general tendency of such a culture to undermine the basis for 
thinking toleration a good. 
1RZDV,KDYHQRWHG6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWROHUDWLRQLVLGLRV\QFUDWLFDQGVRWKH
concerns I have voiced about his conception of toleration need not apply to other conceptions of 
WROHUDWLRQ7KDWEHLQJVDLG6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWLVLdiosyncratic in ways that are meant to make it 
more liberal. He emphasizes that his concern is not to develop a general conception of toleration, 
but specifically to articulate the liberal ideal (GT, 321). The idea that toleration in its traditional 
sense sits uneasily with liberalism is familiar enough.33 My argument suggests that even the 
liberalized interpretation favored by Scheffler still seems in important ways to be at odds with 
the conditions of a liberal culture. Consequently, the attempt to answer the critics of self-
censorship, those who condemn it as cowardly, by grounding it in a practice of liberal toleration 
 19 
seems only partially successful. To be sure, the appeal to toleration may show that the choice to 
self-censor is not just a prudential response provoked by the fear of reprisals; it may show that 
self-censorship is a matter of moral principle. But it does not show what many of those who 
appeal to it have wanted it to show: how self-censorship helps to craft an attractive and 
rewarding way of living with others in conditions of normative diversity. In the next section, I 
shall argue that if we are to make sense of that conviction we may do better to think of self-
censorship not as a duty of toleration in any of its forms be they liberal or otherwise, but instead 
as a duty of civility.  
 
Toleration and Civility 
Toleration and civility are often taken to be ³intimately connected´34 John A. Hall writes that 
toleration is ³almost a synonym for civility´35 while Richard Boyd suggests that the two ideas 
are ³bundled up inextricably´36 One can certainly see why they say this. Both toleration and 
civility are responses to normative diversity, both involve (within limits) the accommodation of 
that diversity, and both countenance the use of self-censorship as a technique of 
accommodation.37 However, I am not convinced that the two ideas are as tightly bound as these 
authors suggest. In this section, I shall elaborate an important difference between the concepts.38 
It is commonly observed that civility discloses two distinct, though importantly related, 
meanings. We may think of civility as an ethical concept, as concerning good manners and 
politeness, decency and gentleness in our dealings with other persons in everyday life. Or we 
may think of civility DVDSROLWLFDOFRQFHSWDVFRQFHUQLQJRQH¶VVWDWXVRUVHQVHRIRQHVHOIDVD
member of a political community, as a citizen with certain rights and responsibilities.39 Thus, it 
may mean one thing to be ethically civil, and quite another to be politically civil. For example, 
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we might view the disposition to participate politically by voting in elections as an indicator of 
political civility or good citizenship, but we would not generally consider it a sign of politeness. 
My primary concern here is with the idea of political civility, though I think it would be a 
mistake to distinguish too sharply. This is partly because the line between political and non-
political conduct upon which the distinction relies is notoriously controversial, and also because 
many of the most pressing questions of political civility pertain to those standards of behavior 
(manners) properly to be expected of members of a political community towards one another in 
their capacity as fellow citizens. 
The standards of civil conduct expected of citizens are likely to involve standards of self-
restraint. Most prominently, it is thought that citizens should keep a ³civil tongue´ - they should 
refrain from certain kinds of insulting speech, and they should sometimes refrain from saying 
what they really think and believe where so doing could be deemed offensive and disruptive to 
society.40 There are clearly similarities here to the practice of toleration, but also some 
differences. On the description I have given, there might seem to be a difference of scope. It 
might seem that while civility exclusively concerns matters of speech, the scope of toleration is 
much broader, encompassing actions as well. In fact, there is disagreement among scholars of 
civility as to its proper scope. While some certainly do interpret it narrowly, as essentially a set 
of speech constraints, others interpret it much more broadly as a social practice involving 
constraints on both speech and action.41 In ordinary usage, we readily speak of civility in conduct 
as well as in speech, and so I do not think the question of scope identifies a necessary distinction 
between the two concepts. In any case, my focus in this article is primarily on the issue of speech 
and self-censorship, where there is clear overlap between toleration and civility, and so if there is 
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a relevant distinction between the two concepts in this regard, we will need to look elsewhere for 
it. 
It is sometimes suggested that the distinctiveness of civility resides in its commitment to 
a degree of sociability or conviviality that is absent from toleration.42 According to Jose Ortega, 
civility reflects, ³before all, the will to live in common´ It is fundamentally ³an attempt to make 
possible the city, the community, common life´43 In its concrete instantiation, civility aims to 
specify a manner of living together with others³LWPHDQVUHJDUGLQJRWKHUSHUVRQVLQFOXGLQJ
RQH¶VDGYHUVDULHVDVPHPEHUVRIWKHVDPHLQFOXVLYHFROOHFWLYLW\LHDVmembers of the same 
society, even though they belong to different parties, or to different religious communities, or to 
GLIIHUHQWHWKQLFJURXSV´44 In this way, civility essentially embodies the acknowledgement of 
society with others, not just in the minimal sense of the acknowledgement that we share space, 
but also that we share a problem. It is bound up in the conviction that finding a way of living 
together is not just my problem or your problem, but a problem we share. As Jeremy Waldron 
suggests, civility is, at root, the disposition to ³stay present´ amid deep diversity and 
disagreement.45 Incivility, then, is reflected in the failure to stay present, either by the unilateral 
LPSRVLWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQRXWORRNRQRWKHUVRUE\WKHEODQNUHIXVDOWRHQJDJHRQany terms 
whatsoever. 
Toleration, it might be said, is different. In its basic and negative sense, toleration is 
thought to be consistent with ³nearly asocial´ relationships.46 I can tolerate something by having 
very little to do with it, by avoiding social contact with it. This possibility is colorfully illustrated 
LQ&KDQGUDQ.XNDWKDV¶VSRUWUD\DORIWKH³liberal archipelago´ - a vision of cultural toleration in 
which groups are simply left alone to live as they wish, uninterfered with by the state and by 
other groups. On this view, we are to envision liberal society ³as an archipelago of different 
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communities operating in a sea of mutual toleration´: ³Each island is a separate domain, cut-off 
from others by waters which are indifferent to its circumstances or to its fate´47 Civility, by 
contrast, presupposes that this sort of isolation and avoidance is not an option (the familiar 
expression ³You could at least be civil!´ is not an invitation to withdraw from social interaction).  
But while this emphasis on sociability might well distinguish civility from the negative, 
WUDGLWLRQDOFRQFHSWLRQRIWROHUDWLRQLWLVOHVVREYLRXVWKDWLWGLVWLQJXLVKHVLWIURP6FKHIIOHU¶V
model of liberal toleration, which, as we have seen, is directly linked with the formation of 
fraternal solidarity. And it does not seem to distinguish it at all from the more affirmative mode 
of ³toleration as recognition´ defended by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, which identifies toleration 
with full inclusion in the polity.48 It might seem that the conceptual map is better captured by 
Sune Laegaard, who presents civility as falling somewhere in the middle of a continuum between 
negative toleration at one end and positive recognition at the other.49  
But I think the distinction between toleration and civility cuts deeper than this model 
suggests. It is misleading to locate civility on a continuum with the different varieties of 
toleration, because civility marks an entirely different way of responding to diversity. Note that it 
is a central feature of the discourse of toleration, in many of its most prominent forms, that it 
emphasizes the particularity of the parties to the practice of toleration ± it emphasizes diversity. 
This is manifestly so on the traditional account of toleration, intimately connected with its 
etymological associations with suffering and bearing up under pressure. As John Horton has it, 
toleration in this sense is a ³deliberate exercise in self-restraint,´DQGLV³FOHDUO\MXGJHPHQWDODQG
KDVDERXWLWDJUXGJLQJFRQGHPQDWRU\TXDOLW\RIWHQDFRQGHVFHQGLQJDQGVXSHULRUDLU´50 Parties 
to the practice of toleration keep their differences firmly in mind, wearing them proudly as 
badges of superior status whilst wilfully restraining themselves from intervention.  
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It may seem that diversity and SDUWLFXODULW\UHFHLYHOHVVHPSKDVLVRQ6FKHIIOHU¶VOLEHUDO
model. As he notes, the practice of liberal toleration does not always involve disapproval, and 
never involves the assertion of superiority. But nevertheless, and as we have seen, it is in fact 
YHU\LPSRUWDQWRQ6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWthat the perception of moral particularity be foregrounded, 
for it is the keen awareness we have of our subjection to the authority of our particular moral 
convictions that is meant to provide the basis for fraternity which in turn supports the practice of 
toleration. If it is to provide the basis for fraternity that Scheffler envisages, then my toleration of 
you must express the fact that I acknowledge that your values are different from my values (and 
perhaps also that I reject your values), but also that I appreciate a commonality between us in 
terms of the importance we each attach to our respective systems of value, and of the similar 
authority we accord to them. 
And, finally, the emphasis of particularity is also evident in the mode of toleration as 
recognition, albeit in a rather different way. Here, disapproval, dislike and condescension have 
no place in the practice of toleration. Instead, particular differences are to be recognized as 
³OHJLWLPDWHRSWLRQV´LQDSOXUDOLVWVRFLHW\51 Thus, particularity is emphasized here not as an 
object of disapproval, but as an object of recognizable value. And here it is not just moral 
particularity that is emphasizHGEXW³IXOO-blown identities, customs, and ways of life.´52 
In contrast, I want to suggest that the practice of civility functions to de-emphasize the 
particularity of parties. While negative toleration is the name we typically give to 
accommodation in spite of differences of values, identities and customs, and toleration as 
recognition is the name we give to accommodation because of such differences (or, at least, in 
recognition of them), I suggest that we think of civility as accommodation irrespective of 
difference. That is to say, we can think of civility as a mode of accommodation in which parties 
 24 
to the practice simply set aside their differences, instead of negatively suppressing them or 
positively affirming them. 
7KHGLVWLQFWLRQKHUHEHWZHHQ³VHWWLQJDVLGH´GLIIHUHQFHVDQG³VXSSUHVVLQJ´WKHPLV
perhaps not immediately perspicuous. When we set aside our differences in the sense I intend 
here, we come to regard them or decide to treat them as not being pertinent to the matter at hand. 
We may still think of them as being important; we simply cease to see them as bearing 
fundamentally on the context in question. When we suppress our differences, by contrast, we still 
consider them and treat them as pertinent to the matter at hand, but also acknowledge that their 
claims are overridden by other, weightier, claims.  
To be sure, this is not always what people mean when they talk about civility, but I do 
think it captures something of WKHWHUP¶V ordinary use, and so constitutes a reasonable 
characterization. For example, the state of American politics is often lamented for its 
³LQFLYLOLW\.´53 At the heart of that complaint is a sense of frustration at the way in which 
rancorous, partisan disputes tend to fill the political scene and crowd out any possibility of 
productive cooperation or, at the limit, any kind of political action whatsoever. And the plea for 
civility in such contexts is importantly not, at least in its more idealistic form, a plea for 
politicians queasily to suppress their differences and compromise, or indeed for politicians to 
come together in full recognition of the legitimacy of their respective positions. On the contrary, 
it is a plea for politicians to set aside their differences in the recognition that the stubborn pursuit 
RI³SHWW\´IDFWLRQDOconcerns is just not relevant to the activity of responsible government, which 
should rather be about the bipartisan pursuit of the collective, or national, interest. In this way, 
the civilitarian setting aside of differences involves the re-direction of attention away from the 
individual or party and its particularities and towards the collective. We see this clearly enough 
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in the etymology of the term: civility is outward-looking. Its association is not with me and my 
burden in the manner of toleration, but rather with the city, the collective, the society. In this 
sense, civility is not a mean between negative toleration and positive recognition, but rather an 
altogether different mode of responding to diversity. 
Incidentally, this is why it is significant that John Rawls characterizes the observance of 
norms of public reason, which demand that we appeal in public discussion only to those reasons 
that are intelligible and accessible to all, as a duty of civility rather than as a duty of toleration.54 
To see public reason as an expression of toleration leads naturally to the familiar objection (to 
ZKLFK6FKHIIOHU¶VDFFRXQWLVLQSDUWDUHVSRQVHWKDWLWVH[HUFLVHLnvolves a potentially damaging 
abrogation RIRQH¶VGHHSHVWFRPPLWPHQWV%XWLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQH[SUHVVLRQRIFLYLOLW\RQWKH
understanding I suggest here, the language of ³abrogation´ seems less apt. On the contrary, 
interpreting public reason as an expression of civility suggests a way in which the will to proffer 
only those reasons that all may share might actually be continuous with, or at least congruent 
ZLWKRQH¶VGHHSO\KHOGFRQYLFWLRQV6RPHDXWKRUVVXJJHVWWKDW5DZOV¶VDFFRXQWRIFLYLOLW\LV
rather ³technical´, and that it has ³little to do with the ordinary notion of civility´55 In fact, I 
think his account illuminates what is perhaps most essential and distinctive about the ordinary 
notion: the will to live together not in spite of differences of values, but irrespective of them. 
The distinction between toleration and civility I am suggesting here is more concretely 
LOOXVWUDWHGLQ(OLMDK$QGHUVRQ¶VLPSRUWDQWVRFLRORJLFDOresearch on race and civility in American 
cities.56 Anderson suggests that the typical urban experience of interaction with strangers is one 
of ³pervasive wariness´: 
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In places such as bus stations, parking garages, and sidewalks, many pedestrians move 
about guardedly, dealing with strangers by employing elaborate facial and eye work, 
replete with smiles nods, and gestures designed to carve out an impersonal but private 
]RQHIRUWKHPVHOYHV«,QQDYLJDWLQJVXFKVSDFHVSHRSOHRIWHQGLYHUWWKHLUJD]HVORRNLQJ 
up, looking down, or looking away, and feign ignorance of the diverse mix of strangers 
WKH\HQFRXQWHU'HIHQVLYHO\WKH\³ORRNSDVW´RU³ORRNWKURXJK´WKHQH[WSHUVRQ
distancing themselves from strangers and effectively consigning their counterparts to a 
form of social oblivion.57  
 
These are spaces of (negative) toleration, and they are familiar enough to anyone who has spent 
any significant amount of time in an urban environment. In such contexts, particularities are 
keenly felt, and visible differences of race, class, culture or belief can be experienced as almost 
insurmountable barriers to association. Such spaces are not necessarily ³unsafe´ They certainly 
can be sites of disorder and violence, but for the most part they are not. And this is because they 
are spaces in which differences are tolerated by the careful cultivation of the sort of ³nearly 
asocial´ relations that Laegaard describes.58 People ³appear simply to follow their noses, at times 
barely avoiding collisions with other strangers. If they speak at all, they may utter a polite 
µexcuse me¶ or µ,¶PVRUU\¶ and, if it seems appropriate, they scowl. In effect, people work to 
shape and guard their own public space´59 
%XW$QGHUVRQ¶VFHQWUDOWKHVLVLVWKDWFLW\OLIHLVQRWDOZD\VOLNHWKLV,QFRQWrast to these 
spaces of toleration, he observes quite different spaces that he describes as ³cosmopolitan 
canopies´: 
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settings that offer a respite from the lingering tensions of urban life and an opportunity 
for diverse peoples to come together. Canopies are in essence pluralistic spaces where 
people engage one another in a spirit of civility, or even comity and goodwill. Through 
SHUVRQDOREVHUYDWLRQWKH\PD\FRPHFDVXDOO\WRDSSUHFLDWHRQHDQRWKHU¶VGLIIHUHQFHVDQG
empathize with the other in a spirit of shared humanity. Under the canopy this sense of 
familiarity often breeds comfort and encourages all to be on their best behavior, 
SURPRWLQJSHDFHIXOUHODWLRQV«,QWKLVFRQWH[WRIGLYHUVLW\DQGFRVPRSROLWDQLVPD
cognitive and cultural basis for trust is established that often leads to the emergence of 
more civil behavior.60 
 
7KHH[DPSOHVXSRQZKLFK$QGHUVRQIRFXVHVDUHWKRVHRI3KLODGHOSKLD¶V5HDGLQJ7HUPLQDO
Market and Rittenhouse Square Park, but we can readily think of other sites in the major cities of 
liberal democracies that might qualify as cosmopolitan canopies. Think, for example, of Brick 
Lane Market in London, of the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, or of the Jardin du Luxembourg in 
Paris.61 It is important to notice that, while these are not generally spaces of ³mere´ toleration, 
they are not generally spaces of recognition either, in which particularities are foregrounded and 
legitimated, or even celebrated. They are, as Anderson stresses, spaces of civility in which race 
and other particularities are ³de-emphasized´62 Differences are ³salient but understated´ and no 
longer seem to present the barrier to association they did outside of the canopy.63 In this sense, 
people under the canopy ³take leave of their particularism´64 
And it is for this reason that a regime of civility is more congruent than a regime of 
toleration with the kinds of interpersonal attachments that we might expect to flourish in liberal 
cultures, and which I described in the previous section. Where the regime of toleration 
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encourages citizens to live together on terms that are keenly mindful of difference, the regime of 
civility encourages citizens to see themselves as willing to live together irrespective of 
difference. By this, and to be clear, I do not mean to suggest that regimes of civility function to 
diminish particularities. If that were the case, then it would seem that such regimes really were at 
odds with the general drift of a liberal culture which tends, if anything, to promote and 
accentuate individuality. Rather, it simply reflects (and promotes) a different way of 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRQH¶VSDUWLFXODULW\DQGVSHFLILFDOO\WKHVWDWXVRIRQH¶VSDUWLFXODULW\LQWKH
formation of solidaristic bonds.  
In short, then: the regime of toleration fosters conditions favorable to the development of 
solidaristic bonds to which considerations of values (your values and my values) are 
fundamental; the regime of civility fosters conditions favorable to the development of solidaristic 
bonds to which considerations of values are not especially important. Consequently, the regime 
of civility fosters conditions that are more congenial to the circumstances of a liberal culture the 
pervasive effect of which is to weaken the sense of subjection to the hierarchical authority of 
values among those who inhabit it. 
When we relate to one another in the spirit of civility, the experience for many will be 
one of liberal friendship of the kind I have described. And, to the extent that this experience is 
rewarding, civility will come to be seen as valuable in itself. The rewards of this way of living 
may in some respects coincide with the sorts of rewards Scheffler associates with life under a 
regime of toleration ± ³the sense of enrichment that comes from developing an appreciation for 
forPVRIYDOXHWKDWDUHUHDOL]HGLQSUDFWLFHVRWKHUWKDQRQH¶VRZQ´ or the sense of exhilaration 
that comes from living confidently ³amidst the whirl of human diversity´GT, 333). But there 
will also be important differences. Those who value the regime of civility are unlikely to delight 
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in the ³subversive and transgressive pleasures afforded by engagement with unfamiliar customs 
and practices´GT, 333). On the contrary, theirs will be the mature and liberating recognition 
that there is really nothing subversive or transgressive about engaging with people different from 
themselves - it is not naughty, it is not disloyal, and there need be no sense of betrayal. It is 
simply normal, and entirely appropriate to the conditions of liberalism.  
 
Conclusion 
If we are to make sense of the perspective of those who see in self-censorship not just a 
prudential strategy for the avoidance of violence, but also the basis for a valuable way of living 
with others, then we do better to think of self-censorship as a duty of civility rather than as a duty 
of toleration. This is because the way of living with others that a regime of toleration promotes is 
not one that is likely to elicit the enthusiasm of the members of a liberal culture for whom moral 
values, beliefs and principles exert only an attenuated authority in their lives. By contrast, the 
way of living with others that a regime of civility promotes, by de-emphasizing moral 
particularities, is more consonant with the conditions of a liberal culture and more congenial to 
the forms of liberal friendship that flourish within it. 
 To repeat, my argument has not been that this kind of liberal friendship is a form of 
solidarity that all citizens ought to find valuable. My contention is rather that if we are to make 
sense of the enthusiastic allegiance of liberal citizens to the practice of accommodation, then we 
may do better to interpret it by reference to the kind of civility-friendship model of 
accommodation I have described rather than the kind of toleration-fraternity model that 
Scheffler proposes. The reasons for that have to do with the cultural effects of liberalism and its 
propensity to transform the manner in which citizens relate to their values, principles and ideals. 
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It may seem that I have been presenting toleration as an anachronism, as an artifact of the 
past that we have outgrown in liberal modernity. But that is not my intention. First, I see no 
reason to accept the presupposition of moral progress - insofar as toleration has been displaced 
by civility there is no reason to suppose there will be no further displacements in the future, and 
there is no reason to suppose that the transition from toleration to civility is to be accounted an 
unalloyed good.65 And secondly, toleration has not been displaced by civility anyway. Liberal 
cultures have pervasively shaped the self, but as Taylor notes, there are many (perhaps even a 
majority) living in the world today who continue to experience a strong sense of subjection to the 
hierarchical authority of morality, who regard deep diversity as a regrettable abnormality and 
who look upon the liberal ³seekers´ as hopelessly shallow and superficial. As I have suggested, 
any given city is likely to reveal spaces of civility and of toleration. As societies (and perhaps as 
individuals, too) we are divided between toleration and civility. 
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